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The loss of subsidized trade with the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe hurtled Cuba into
its worst economic crisis since Fidel Castro's government came to power in 1959. To confront the
crisis, the Cuban government initiated a process of profound economic reforms in 1991, which, in
effect, amount to a revolution within the Cuban revolution. Since June of this year, the government
accelerated the reform process, announcing a series of new policy changes. (For detailed coverage
of the economic reforms implemented from July-September, see Chronicle 10/21/93.) Following
is an interview with Dr. Nelson Valdes, LADB Project Director. Valdes, a Cuban-American who
has lived in the US since 1961, is a leading scholar on Cuba, having published five books on Cuban
affairs since 1972. Valdes travels regularly to the island, and conducts study tours for US citizens and
others interested in examining the Cuban revolution today. Valdes is a sociologist who has taught at
the University of New Mexico since 1966. He has provided testimony to the US Congress on Cuba,
and has provided reports on human rights in Cuba and other issues to multilateral institutions,
such as the Organization of American States (OAS). Valdes is also frequently consulted by Cuban
government officials on US-Cuba relations. In the following interview conducted on Oct. 16, 1993
by LADB economic affairs editor Kevin Robinson Valdes discusses the recent economic reforms, as
well as the social consequences of the economic crisis that now grips the island. He also explores
some of the policy changes likely to be announced by the government in the coming months. In
fact, on Oct. 30, the Cuban government disclosed some new reforms to be implemented before
year-end 1993, some of which were touched on in the interview, such as plans to establish a broadbased tax system on the island and new currency exchange laws that will allow citizens to freely
trade the Cuban peso for foreign currency. Part II of the interview to be published in the next edition
of the Chronicle will cover political changes taking place on the island and the future of US-Cuba
relations. KR: Let's begin with the economic reforms. The process began quite awhile ago, but it
seems to have been gaining in speed and intensity with each passing year. It would seem that since
June, there's been an important radicalization of the economic reform process, including a series
of major reforms. Can you explain what these latest reforms are, what are they intended to do, and
what you feel will be their real impact on Cuba? NV: Certainly since June the pace of reforms has
picked up. I would like to stress, however, that there is a tendency among those who write about
Cuba to assume that the changes which have occurred since June are simply the result of temporary,
present circumstances, and that consequently these are merely short-term policies intended to
confront the urgency of the moment. I think that's an erroneous interpretation. The changes which
have occurred since June must be seen in a much broader context, including, for example, reforms
to the Cuban constitution approved in 1992. The constitutional reforms in fact paved the way for
some of the economic changes announced recently. There are basically four new policies. First was
the decision, announced on July 26, to "depenalize" or decriminalize the possession and limited
use of foreign currency, which includes not just dollars, but also the Spanish peseta, the German
mark, the British pound, the French franc, and so forth. This policy is the product of previous
changes in Cuba, such as having promoted more tourism and more foreign investment, in order
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to bring more dollars into the country. Cuba had been functioning for at least the last four to five
years with two different currencies, with the dollar gaining more than the Cuban peso. Why has
the dollar been gaining? Because, the Cuban peso has been artificially kept almost at a parity with
foreign currency when its true value is much less. The Cuban currency has not been permitted to
float to its true value, and the government had to address that problem. Some say the new policy
represents the "dollarization" of the Cuban economy. To some degree that is true, it does. But at
a deeper level, what the government is trying to do is create a space for foreign currency to bring
discipline to the Cuban economy, which the Cuban peso is unable to do. Such discipline could
be achieved with the peso, but only if the government were to devalue the currency, and they
have decided that for the moment, they are not going to devalue. Therefore, they are allowing
the dollar to have a much more hegemonic role within the economy, hoping that this will bring
more discipline to the labor force and to the market. Still, it's important to note that this measure is
essentially a monetarist policy. It's not a structural policy. The second policy which is closely linked
to the dollar decriminalization is the decision to allow more Cuban- Americans to visit Cuba. This
measure is a direct response to the country's foreign exchange crisis. Cuban economists believe
that Cuban-Americans could bring anywhere between US$300 million and US$500 million, and
some even say as much as US$800 million, per year into the Cuban economy. It would represent
much greater dollar earnings than what tourism now brings in. The decision is highly profitable,
since simply allowing Cuban-Americans to send money to Cuba, and allowing them to visit their
relatives on the island, requires very few investments. It is not a matter of pouring money into
the development of industries, such as biotechnology, or pharmaceuticals, nor does it imply the
kind of costs necessary to attract foreign investors to Cuba, like developing the infrastructure for
tourism. So this policy was seen as something that, from an economic standpoint, could produce
short-term results, but with few short-term economic costs to the state. KR: So that's two policies,
both of which are interconnected. What other policies have been implemented since June? NV:
A number of other things have occurred, but two are of particular importance, and are in fact
related to the two measures which I've already mentioned. First, the government decided to permit
117 new private productive occupations to function in Cuba. Those occupations are known as
"trabajo por cuenta propia," or "working on your own." At present Cuba has a surplus labor force
of between 500,000 and 700,000 people. Part of this population has been displaced because the
Cuban state traditionally the main source of employment has been forced to drastically reduce
the scope of its operations. This has created a huge underemployed labor force. This represents
a serious problem in the Cuban case, since the social security and employment system requires
that the state provide unemployed or underemployed workers with an income in any case. This is
linked, then, to the problem of excess liquidity in Cuban pesos. The idea behind these measures
is to reduce the burden on the Cuban state to provide workers with an income. On the one hand,
they are allowing Cubans to possess and spend dollars, and on the other hand, they are allowing
them to set up business enterprises to provide self-employment on their own. Together, these
essentially amount to incentives to get workers off the government dole. It is important to point
out that this policy is essentially beginning to create the space for the development of a private
sector in Cuba. This represents a complete departure from the trend which began in 1962, and which
was expanded in March 1968, the year when the government essentially abolished private sector
employment. It's important to look at the sequence of the reforms since June. First there was a
monetary policy by decriminalizing the dollar, then we saw a sort of combination of monetary and
fiscal policy by trying to attract as many dollars as possible into Cuba, and third the government
allowed private entrepreneurs to appear. None of these measures implied any privatization of
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state resources. With the fourth measure, however, the state is further attempting to disengage
from the responsibility of providing people with employment and an income, but this time going
one step further by allowing the establishment of agricultural cooperatives on state farms under
certain circumstances, which in a sense is a redistribution away from state ownership over one
basic means of production: land. In Cuba, there are three types of property. First, there is private,
or individually-owned, property. There is very little of this, but you do have some privately-owned
land. Second is the socially-owned or cooperative sector. Third, of course, is the state. What they are
doing with this new policy is, for the first time, setting up a situation where the state is transferring
land to production cooperatives. This also breaks with the trend in place since 1963 where the state
had been gaining land away from cooperatives, away from the private sector. Already as of midOctober some 1,125 of these new cooperatives had been set up on the old state farms... KR: That
many farms have been handed over just since the decree was announced in early September? NV:
That's right. The option that the Cuban government has offered is being taken up in a big way
by the state entities and by agricultural workers who used to work for the state. The agreement
is that these workers do not become owners of the land, but they do become owners of what is
produced. It is not yet clear what happens to the actual resources on the land, tractors and other
instruments of production. I assume that the production units will be given a grace period during
which they will be given seeds and other resources and at some point, these cooperatives will
have to pay rent in order to use these resources. KR: So, in sum, there are four policies that have
been decreed since July. First, the elimination of criminal penalties for holding foreign currency;
second, allowing more Cubans outside the country to travel to the island; third, allowing private
occupations to be run for the first time since 1968; and fourth, the formation of cooperatives on
state lands. Do all these decrees represent a move away from a centrally planned economy to a
mixed economy in Cuba where a private sector would be allowed to exist alongside the state? Or
are they just cosmetic changes that could be reversed at a later date? NV: I think the Cubans are
attempting to move towards a kind of "market socialism," that is, allowing the market to play a
greater role while at the same time attempting to maintain some of the key elements of Cuban
socialism. The government is dismantling some sectors of the state economy. But it is important to
keep in mind that so far, no measures have been implemented which would permit the emergence
of an independent, economically-powerful bloc in Cuba. These measures will not foment a social
base for future political movements capable of challenging the class character of the revolution.
What the Cubans are allowing is the emergence of new individual enterprises. We're not talking
about joint stock companies or about corporate institutions in the private sector. Now in the case
of foreign investments, there have been some dramatic changes both in terms of the percentage
of foreign control allowed in each enterprise and in terms of what sectors of the Cuban economy
foreign interests can participate in. At present, no sector is off limits to foreign investors, with the
exception of education and health care. Three and one half years ago, when all of this got started,
foreign investment was limited to biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and tourism. KR: There are no
restrictions now on what sectors foreign companies can invest in? NV: No. Under the current policy,
each and every proposal will be evaluated on its own merits. If it is a good proposal, no matter what
sector the proposed investment is in, negotiations are held. In terms of the percentage of foreign
capital in joint ventures, a couple of years ago they were talking about 50% foreign and 50% Cuban
capital. Now, it can be 99% foreign and only 1% Cuban! The idea is that neither the new individual
entrepreneurs, nor foreign investors who are supposed to have only business dealings and stay
out of politics will have much of a projection in terms of constituting a social base for an alternative
political project. However, there is one sector that could develop in that direction. In Cuba, we
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are beginning to see the emergence on a significant scale of "sociedades anonimas," essentially
private Cuban corporations. They function like a corporation. They sell stock like a corporation,
selling to the Cuban state and to foreign investors. As far as I know, there is no stock being sold
to individual Cubans, but that may change in the future. These companies essentially function
like capitalist, private enterprises. The managers are appointed by the state. These companies are
linked to some of the most important institutions in Cuban society, including the armed forces, the
different government ministries, etc. Each enterprise has a great deal of autonomy and consequently
they can engage in all kinds of deals, just like any capitalist firm. The difference here is that a
percentage of the profits generated by each enterprise goes to the Cuban treasury. A portion of the
profits and revenues may also be invested by the enterprise in order to modernize technology, or
to create a special fund for wages and bonuses for the workers. You have a situation here where
because the managers work within a capitalist framework and they are trained to function like
capitalists the bottom line for them is profit. These autonomous state enterprises are becoming very
powerful. They often have access to more resources than the government ministries do. Indeed,
many ministries now rely on these enterprises in order to finance their own activities. The armed
forces, for example, are now in the business of running hotels in order to generate foreign exchange
and provide the resources necessary to at least maintain their military hardware. KR: How many of
these autonomous enterprises exist now and what are some the state sectors involved? NV: I think
there are about 80 of them. One example of how this works is with the so-called "protocol houses."
For instance, the Ministry of Education, the Communist Party, the armed forces, and others have
these hotels for the officer corps or employees, or visitors, to go and stay for rest and recreation.
Now they are being allowed to transform the R- and-R hotels into tourist hotels! Whatever income
is generated is theirs to keep. The University of Havana has been told the same thing. The Junta
Central de Planificacion (JUCEPLAN) the central planning board which plans for the whole society
is now in the business of setting up courses with a number of universities to bring people to learn
about the Cuban economy. Whatever money is generated from these courses is used to run the
central planning board. So, as far as economic administration is concerned, there is a de facto
decentralization taking place on two fronts. It adds up to a move toward self-sufficiency, although
"self- financing" is the term the Cubans use. The centralized budget is less and less important.
The Cuban state all of the ministries and all of the mechanisms of the command economy are
ceasing to function that way. KR: In addition to the reforms we've already discussed, are there
more fundamental changes in economic policy now being considered by the government? NV:
Well, at some point in the future the Cuban authorities are going to have to address the issue of
the informal market, as well as the black market. The informal market is bound to expand rapidly
with the opening up of these 117 private occupations. The black market, meanwhile, has been fed by
supplies which come from theft, as well as from goods that producers, such as farmers, are supposed
to supply the state but instead decide to supply to black market entrepreneurs, who then resell
the products. The black market functions on the basis of a network of people who provide a sort
of infrastructure for the distribution of goods. As the Cuban state has lost resources, it has become
less and less capable of delivering the goods. The black market has, in essence, come to fill that
void. Historically the Cuban state has repressed such activity. The term that has been used for these
people is "intermediaries." The intermediaries have been publicly referred to by the authorities as
"parasites," since they apparently don't add any value to a good, reselling products at higher prices
to buyers without having added anything to the good. But in reality, they do add something. As long
as the state system is unable to distribute goods efficiently, the black market is, in essence, adding
the value of distribution. Perhaps if there was more competition among black market distributors,
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if these activities weren't illegal, the prices would come down. I think the government is eventually
going to have to allow more space for these types of activities. KR: They will indeed have to come
to terms with scarcities on the market and find some form of allowing independent supply chains.
But they will also have to deal with the problem of excess liquidity in Cuba an estimated 9 billion
"excess" pesos I believe are now in circulation otherwise, inflationary pressures will be a constant
problem. In fact, if they open up the market under the present circumstances, by establishing let's
say a free farmers' market, it could lead to an uncontrollable inflationary spiral. NV: The official
estimate of excess liquidity that Fidel and others have referred to is 9 billion pesos. Nevertheless,
it is probably more like 11 billion, perhaps a little more. You have a situation today in which the
average Cuban household has enough money stashed away to not have to work at all for four or
five months. The government in part addressed this problem when it opened up the 117 private
occupations, since a new tax on these trades was also established. It is a regressive tax. In the final
analysis, it is not really a tax but rather a fee that you pay regardless of how much income you make.
Why did they establish a regressive tax or fee? Because at present the state does not have in place
the mechanisms needed to administer a progressive tax system. A progressive tax system requires
a huge infrastructure. First of all, you need people who know something about taxes. Second, you
need to be able to monitor how much people produce. Another way of addressing the issue of excess
liquidity is by devaluing the peso, letting the peso slide until it finds its true level. Of course, such
a measure has its own social consequences, especially for those living on a fixed income, let's say
if you are retired or if you are on a scholarship. A chicken may end up costing 120 pesos, or the
equivalent of 14 days of income. Such measures could contribute to a stratification of consumption,
unless goods are distributed on the basis of capacity to purchase. KR: So, what are some of the next
economic reforms we're likely to see decreed by the government in the coming months? What's
next on the agenda? NV: Many things are likely to happen. But don't expect dramatic policy shifts.
These changes will probably be adopted in a piecemeal fashion. For example, I think we will see an
expansion of the list of private occupations that are allowed. I also think we're going to see things
like the introduction of a tax system, the establishment of "free port areas" on the island, and the
opening up of the banking sector to foreign capital. I think we're also going to see a situation where
people will be allowed to buy shares in the autonomous state enterprises. And there will probably
be significant changes in terms of opening up the agricultural sector. Another area they're looking at
is gambling. With relatively little investment, foreign exchange could be generated in the short term.
They could establish something similar to what you have in Atlantic City. Likewise, we might see
a greater role for the private sector in fishing. Why fishing? It's one thing to turn state-owned land
over to farmers. But the ocean...you can allow anyone who wants to go and fish and then sell their
catch without giving anything up. I think they will also attempt to get exiles to set up businesses
for relatives in Cuba. Granted, the US embargo makes it difficult, but there are ways to get around
that. At present, a Cuban exile can send US$300 every three months to Cuba US$1,200 per year to a
household. But what constitutes a household? Several US$1,200 packages could be sent to different
individuals in the extended family, and then put together in order to set up a business. KR: A twopart question. First, to what extent will these reforms really confront the country's economic crisis?
In your opinion, how much will they really help to resolve the crisis? Second, in the medium to
long-term, to what extent does all of this that's going on represent structural changes in Cuban
society and the economy? Are the reforms irreversible, or could they at a later time, if the economy
rebounds, be reversed? NV: Regarding the second question, I think both the government and the
population at large have come to the realization that Cuba must be more modest in terms of its
goals, in terms of the population's standard of living. They have seen that to meet all the basic
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demands of the population requires a level of capital that Cuba simply does not have, and may
not have for a long time to come. So unless the international situation changes drastically, the
assumption is that the present situation is one that is going to remain for a fairly long time. Thus,
Cuba must move towards self sufficiency; there are no more free lunches. What I think they're
trying to do is to see how to make adjustments to assure survival in such a way that the essential
character of the Cuban revolution is not dissipated. Now, going back to the first question, can these
measures turn the economic crisis around? One has to be realistic. Cuba is a Third World country
with very few material resources. For example, how will Cuba resolve the electricity problem?
There is a tremendous shortage in terms of oil supplies. But the shortage of oil is also related to
the fact that the Cuban revolution led to an increase in demand, providing electricity services to
communities, for example, that never enjoyed such services previously. Can the Cuban economic
strategy succeed in regaining the pre-1989 levels of production, and later begin to grow again? I
don't think you'd find anyone in Cuba saying that's feasible in the short term. At best what you can
hope for is to halt the decline. Then you could have a fairly long period, five years perhaps, during
which you remain more or less at that level, slowly beginning to regain the lost ground. Of course
the situation would be dramatically different if there were a change in the international context.
For example, if the Latin American countries were to allow Cuba to acquire oil under the favorable
terms of the San Jose Pact, the situation would be very different. KR: Well, that brings us to the
issue of the US trade embargo. To what extent is it realistic to imagine that the Cuban economy,
even in the long term, can begin to rebound if the embargo continues to exist? NV: The embargo is
aimed at compelling Cuba to adopt major social, economic and political changes, to make drastic
changes in a manner defined as "acceptable" to the US. The idea behind the embargo is that if
you make the situation in Cuba sufficiently costly from an economic standpoint, the revolutionary
leadership will have no choice but to surrender, to give up. I think that if you look at history, you
can see that this is just not possible. Certainly not with the leadership that has been in place since
1959, nor with those who have come up through the ranks since 1959. The problem is that, in order
to do what the US wants, Cuba would have to forfeit its national sovereignty. That's not going to
happen. So we have an interesting situation where the US policy will not change until and unless
the Cubans change. Yet the historical experience suggests that the maximum demands that the
US is putting forward cannot possibly be met. So what you have is an impasse. I think the Cubans
assume that this impasse will remain, that it is a matter of just hanging on until one of the two sides
is forced to give up. But let's assume for a moment that the Cuban perspective is wrong and that,
regardless of what the political leadership may wish, the actual material conditions the difficulties
imposed by the US embargo become so harsh that enough social stress is generated within Cuba
that a potentially explosive situation is created. I assure you that, before such an explosion can occur,
the Cuban leadership will set up an "escape valve," they will create the circumstances necessary
to avoid social upheaval. They came up with a solution in 1959, in 1964, and again in 1980. They
will simply tell Cubans that the situation is difficult and so forth, and you are free to go, to leave
the island if you wish. KR: In economic terms, what will the Cubans have to do in order to survive
over the long term, even with the embargo in place? NV: Above all, they will have to stress food
production. They will need to entice foreign capital to go into food production in Cuba. They will
need to come up with creative ways of utilizing the nation's land resources. There are several
problems, though, in this regard. First, many of the crops which Cuba is well-suited to produce
do not match the eating habits of the population. For example, Cuba can produce soy very well,
but Cubans don't eat soy products. Second, the government needs to shift away from a policy
which has relied on capital intensive methods, lots of tractors, lots of insecticides, etc. So the main
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priority at present is to generate enough dollars in order to assure electricity and food production.
In the case of oil, they have handled the shortages in a rather efficient manner. I assume that will
continue to be the case. So the main problem will be assuring adequate food supplies. I think the
"plan alimentario," or national food plan, has not yet produced the desired results, but not so much
because of problems in producing sufficient foodstuffs. The problem has been how to transport
foodstuffs from the countryside to the cities. So I think that in these two areas oil and food supplies
the answer is yes, they can survive economically. The big question is, can the Cuban population
manage to deal with these permanent, ongoing hardships? That is a social issue. I think most people
reach a point where they simply give up. And I believe that's exactly what US policymakers are
thinking about. KR: The social consequences of the situation that Cuba has been facing now for the
past few years are quite dramatic. To what extent is there really a social crisis building inside Cuba?
What are the indications that such a crisis might be building? Where are the cracks beginning to
appear? NV: A couple of days ago, about a dozen members of the Cuban ballet company were in
Spain on a performance tour. When their tour was over, they decided not to return to Cuba and
they stayed in Spain. They issued a statement indicating that, although they were not returning,
they did not want to request political asylum. What they were asking, not of the Spanish authorities
but of the Cuban government, was for permission to work abroad for the time being. Within 24
hours the Cuban government granted the request. This case suggests to me several things. For
one, these people, under a very difficult situation, do not want to politicize the fact that they can
no longer live under such circumstances, that they would prefer to live abroad. They are instead
saying, "We're not breaking with this process," and the Cuban government is saying, "In the past,
we've dealt with people like you by calling them traitors, but now we say it's OK." I think it is also
revealing in the sense that you don't have a situation where people are saying, "The situation is
awful, let's take action into our own hands and change the government." People will tell you that
it's because it's extremely difficult to do anything within Cuba since there is a repressive state, and
so on. Certainly it is very difficult to act politically in Cuba if you're challenging the system directly.
Why then, instead of choosing to become more efficient in terms of clandestine work or other forms
of opposing the system, do they opt to leave Cuba? There are several reasons. First, the Cuban
political leadership continues to some degree to occupy the political high ground and the moral
high ground. Second, most of the dissidents are calling for dialogue with the authorities. But they
want the Cuban government to sit down with them even though they have very little strength. The
dissidents have not constituted within Cuba any kind of structured, organized, popularly supported
organization that in some fashion would demonstrate to the Cuban government that they have
support. Last but not least, in the final analysis, if you take a raft, well, you take a chance 72 hours at
sea, maybe you reach Florida, maybe you die. Cubans are constantly bombarded with the message
that in the US, anything and everything is possible. It's an attractive proposition, despite the risks
involved. Now, why would you want to stay in Cuba and go through a whole process of trying
to overthrow Fidel? No one has been able to overthrow him in 30 years. What's maybe worse, if
you "succeed," then you inherit an array of extraordinary problems! So why not take the next best
solution: take the risks and get out of there. And that is what people are doing. So on the one hand,
you have a US policy which is making it ever-more difficult for Cubans to lead a normal life, people
are beginning to go hungry, and it's getting worse. On the other hand, there is no organized agency
of social change or political change in place, so everything points in the direction of fomenting more
migration out of Cuba. In this sense, there is a huge gap between the professed aims of US policy
and the reality of the effects of that policy. There aren't many other scenarios out there. Of course
it's always possible that things could get out of hand, and you have a situation where there is some
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 7 of 10

LADB Article Id: 057220
ISSN: 1060-4189

type of revolt, but there are many factors which argue against this as a real possibility. What else
is there? I have not found anyone who actually believes that Fidel Castro will capitulate, will just
say "uncle" or, "I give up! Here Jorge Mas Canosa, you rule Cuba." Even if Fidel wanted to do so,
the military would never allow such a thing to happen. KR: As you pointed out, a "social crisis" is
very different from a "political crisis," and indeed US policy is aimed at fomenting the former to
eventually pave the way for the latter. If, in that scenario, the first stage is a social crisis, then to
what extent do we see that first crisis developing on the island? NV: There are numerous signs.
Certainly at an ideological level there is a crisis. For starters, the community of nations that Cuba
identified with and that supported Cuba has simply disappeared. Today, even within the leadership,
you won't find many people in Cuba who still say that Marxism and Leninism is the answer, or that
there is a socialist route. Now what they say is that it is necessary to "think with our own heads." On
the one hand, that creates new opportunities. But in the meantime, it has created a huge vacuum.
Before, there were certainties, there were handbooks that said, "This is the way to do it." One
consequence of this ideological vacuum has been a retrenchment into nationalism. There has been
a lot of emphasis on the idea that, "although we may be isolated government-wise, nevertheless,
we're still independent." The second thing I would point out in this regard has to do with Cuban
youth. For the first time since 1959, young people find themselves in a situation where they cannot
foresee that their life is going to be better than that of their parents. Although this may be prevalent
throughout the Third World, it is something completely new in Cuba. Young people are being told
now to avoid thinking in terms of the standard of living that in the past had been promised by the
Revolution. Everything now is framed in terms of "sacrifice." Third is a crisis among intellectuals,
at least among those who have an extensive knowledge of the outside world. I'm talking about
the people who manufacture, distribute, transmit and play with ideas; artists, the opinion-makers,
people in the media, and so forth. There is a dramatic crisis of alienation among these people.
Many of them have taken refuge outside of Cuba, if not necessarily breaking with the government.
Whatever they may be doing, they have decided not to try and weather the crisis in Cuba. This is
certainly a sign of decomposition. Then of course there's the increase in crime. Here in the US, we
take crime for granted. In the 1960s, for example, crime as we tend to think of it was almost nonexistent in Cuba. Armed robbery was unthinkable. In comparison to those days, there has been an
alarming rise in all types of crime. The situation still pales in comparison to countries like Colombia
or Guatemala. It's the same situation in terms of prostitution. Without doubt there has been an
increase in prostitution in Cuba. But before, there was none. If we compare the level of prostitution
in Cuba today with the average Third World country, or with let's say New York, there is certainly
less prostitution in Cuba. KR: But Cuba must be judged in relation to Cuba's own history. NV: That's
right. And in that sense, there are signs of concern as well. For example, the degree of community
and social solidarity that existed in Cuban society before is being replaced by a greater emphasis
on the personal, on personal or individual solutions. People are hustling at an individual level, and
that was not the case before. But ultimately, I would argue that the social crisis is going to be defused
before it can be converted into a political crisis. Even the enemies of the Cuban government see
that the leadership is attempting to confront the crisis. And there are many factors which make
it difficult for this crisis to manifest itself politically. Interestingly, I think this might be different
if the US didn't have the embargo. The fact that the US has superimposed this embargo makes it
exceedingly difficult to separate out what is government inefficiency, or to separate out the trends
you have in all of the Third World, from those which are simply a consequence of the embargo. If
the embargo were removed, we would have a very interesting situation: how would the Cubans
now in power handle what in the final analysis may be a Third World crisis? KR: At another level,
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to what extent is social decomposition manifesting itself within Cuban institutionsthemselves, such
as in the armed forces, for example? NV: There are a number of institutions to consider: the mass
organizations, the Cuban Communist Party, the government institutions, including the police and
the armed forces, and the mass media. Let's talk about the party first. It is important to note the
degree to which the Communist Party has managed to remain cohesive. There's no Leon Trotsky
in exile in the case of Cuba. There are no prominent dissidents writing from outside, denouncing
what is happening in Cuba, nothing of the sort. Some officials have defected, but none were highranking. The highest Cuban official who came to the US was Gen. Rafael del Pino, but he was
working on research, matters related to the history of the Cuban armed forces. At the time he
defected, he didn't have command over any troops. If we look at the people who have defected
recently, what they usually talk about is that they defected because of the economic problems they
were confronting. This is rather interesting. Since they are usually seeking political asylum, one
would expect them to say, "Well I'm defecting because of the dictatorship." Of course, it's kind of
hard for them to say that because the dictatorship has been there for 34 years now! Why weren't
they bothered by that before? Despite the continued cohesiveness, I do think that there is a serious
crisis within the party, a crisis that manifests itself at several different levels. First, there are the
hard-core dogmatics in the party who now find themselves asking, "What do we do now? We used
to preach Marxism and Leninism, and we can't do that anymore." The old answers just don't work
anymore. Second, there is a crisis in terms of the methods that were used for political work. They
don't work anymore either. The communist parties in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union
were totally aloof to what was happening among the population, and this is something which has
raised a whole set of questions in terms of legitimacy, just like the Sandinistas had to confront in
Nicaragua. Cubans within the party are trying to come to terms with that. There are people in the
party who have problems with the changes that are occurring today in Cuba. At one level, perhaps
they understand that the changes are necessary given the extraordinary circumstances facing the
country, that in a sense they have been imposed from outside, but still they don't like the changes.
Oftentimes they are upset by the changes. They find it outrageous and unacceptable that you now
have to go back to the exile community and knock on their doors. It is a matter of self-pride and of
self-identity, of who these people are as human beings and as political activists. In a way, what's
happening today in Cuba goes against the grain of everything they've done and everything they've
been trained to do all these years. This is related to the problem of internal debate. For all intents
and purposes, the Cuban revolutionary leadership has not engaged in a real discussion of what it
is that Cuba ought to be doing. That debate has not taken place. So, there is a demand that there
should be more internal discussion within the party. Now, if that's what is taking place within the
party, imagine the disorientation among those who are not in the party. There is confusion as to
what direction this whole thing is moving in. Consequently, many people think that what may be
happening is the construction of a capitalist type of society. In fact, I don't think this is the case, but
nonetheless, I think many Cubans feel that the leadership is moving towards capitalism as perhaps
the only means to remain in a leadership position. I really think the situation is much more complex
than that, but it is a sentiment which exists. There are also problems with the mass organizations,
in part because they've lost the functions which they used to have. The mass organizations used
to be "transmission belts" for the Communist Party, whereby they simply received orders from
above and passed them down to the bases below, and then they would reinform the leadership at
the top on what the base reactions were. But the party itself has functional problems now. At the
same time, all the government ministries have been decentralized, and consequently they can no
longer provide the patronage they used to provide. The mass organizations can't even communicate
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 9 of 10

LADB Article Id: 057220
ISSN: 1060-4189

with the grass roots because of the shortage of paper. When a party document goes down to the base
level, we're talking about one copy of a document that has to be shared by all members, passed from
hand to hand, because there's not enough paper to make copies. So the level of discussion may have
increased in terms of verbal exchanges, but actual formal discussion within the party has declined.
KR: Outside of the formal institutions, is such debate taking place among the population in general?
NV: Interestingly enough, I would say that in Cuba, you have a situation where the people are very
political, but the society is actually de-politicized. If you go up and talk with any Cuban, you will
find that they know a lot about politics, about how the world of politics functions. Yet at the same
time, these are people who are not involved in politics as an everyday concern, either in support
or in opposition. They're not exactly neutral, it's just that they're not, at this point, taking politics
into their own hands. Thus, at least for now, the Cuban government has some time and room to
maneuver. Given the prevailing attitudes regarding what society is all about, even highly politicized
Cubans are not well disposed to move from social discontent to political action. What happens
instead, if they do decide to act politically, usually the political act of choice is to simply depart, to
leave the country.

-- End --
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